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INTRODUCTION: AUTOCRACY, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT  
For  several  decades,  development  policy  specialists  and  donor  agencies  have 
championed  investment  in  the  judicial  systems  of  developing  countries  to  promote 
economic growth and, eventually, democracy.  The assumption of a causal link among 
these three phenomena motivates donors’ investments in the physical and human capacity 
of the legal system. Some reforms are narrowly focused—better enforcement of property 
rights and contract law—conducive to enhanced trade and investment.   Although these 
narrow reform programs imply that political liberalisation is an ultimate objective, studies 
are  unable  to  substantiate  causality  between  the  rule  of  law,  economic  growth  and 
democracy [Carothers (2003)]. Autocratic regimes may establish courts to protect the 
property rights of regime insiders and to expropriate the rights of outsiders.  
In our view a rule of law will have emerged only once the state has achieved 
legitimacy in the hearts and minds of citizens. The idea that better rule of law would 
generate  economic  growth,  which  would  in  turn  build  constituencies  for  democratic 
reforms will be questioned in this paper.  An alternative view will be suggested, most 
notably the alignment of national identity with the institutions of the state is critical to 
establishing a rule of law.   
  
THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE COURTS ACCORDING 
TO REGIME TYPE 
  The consequences of judicial independence for resource distribution will vary 
according to regime type. A judicial system and with it judicial politics can be used as a 
tool  to  enhance  political  survival  of  leaders,  within  authoritarian  regimes  just  as  in 
democratic ones.  Courts may help reduce costs of commercial transactions for private 
citizens in both contexts.  Democratic leaders face incentives to provide such protection 
broadly, as with the SEC regulations on investment in the U.S.  In contrast, autocrats face 
incentives to provide selective benefits that maximise control over economic activity.
12 
An effective legal system depends on coordination with other state functions, which are 
also  politically  controlled.  Impartial  judgment  by  the  courts  depends  on  appropriate 
police  work  for evidence  gathering, and enforcement of  decisions after the court has 
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ruled.    Both  political  and  administrative  complexities  can  interfere  with  the  court’s 
independence and credibility in enforcing the law.  Insufficient notification of procedural 
changes,  inconsistent  interpretation  of  regulatory  requirements,  and  insufficient 
enforcement of licensing requirements are just some of the bureaucratic processes that 
can undermine the court’s role in advancing commercial law. 
Court functions that we associate with facilitating economic growth—attracting 
capital, enforcing contracts, helping to build a revenue base, and maintaining bureaucratic 
discipline—are  applied  selectively  in  order  to  reward  the  winning  coalition.  The 
preferential or discretionary enforcement of property rights may still generate observable 
growth, but surpluses are not distributed evenly.  This is a critical difference between the 
applications of jurisprudence in democratic societies versus autocratic ones:  the more 
surplus  an  autocrat  generates,  the  more  she  can  pay  off  critical  supporters  that  will 
maximise her tenure in office.   
In a democratic system, a large pool of citizens has input into the process by which 
leaders are chosen.  This set is called the “selectorate” by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 
[BDM (2003)].  A subset of the selectorate actually chooses the leader; this group is the 
“winning  coalition,”  consisting  of  the  ruler  and  allies  such  as  the  military  and  other 
instruments  of  power.  The  selectorate  potentially  has  access  to  the  benefits  that  are 
distributed by the leader.  Both the selectorate and the winning coalition are large in 
democratic  societies, in contrast to small  winning coalitions in autocratic regimes, in 
which the winning coalition is small.  With a small winning coalition, the leader has an 
incentive to provide allies with private goods (or targeted public goods) in exchange for 
political loyalty, at the expense of evenly distributed public goods.  Inequality works to 
the advantage of  the autocrat as  membership in the  winning coalition becomes  more 
valuable.    The  most  durable  autocracies  have  a  small  winning  coalition  with  a  large 
selectorate, because members of the winning coalition have more to lose if they do not 
support the ruler grows over time as the ruler learns the price for which loyalty can be 
secured; the personal wealth of those with connections to leadership increases as loyalty 
becomes cheaper to purchase. 
  Growth in autocratic regimes therefore has a very different effect than growth in 
democratic  systems.    Democratic  rulers  have  strong  incentives  to  promote  growth  in 
order to provide public goods inclusively to the selectorate and general population.  If a 
democratic leader fails to provide public goods, she may be removed from office.  For the 
autocrat who has secured a solid base of support, the reciprocal arrangements between the 
state  and  the  winning  coalition  do  not  require  economic  growth  to  be  sustained. 
Sometimes better economic performance in certain sectors may work to the advantage of 
the winning coalition, but often corruption and economic inefficiency increase as the 
autocrat becomes more politically entrenched.   
Contrary to Mancur Olsen’s “stationary bandit” argument [Olson (1993)] that an 
autocrat’s political security is directly tied to growth, autocrats who promote broadly 
distributed economic development may actually see their tenure in office decline because 
the interests of society are at odds with those of the ruler.  Instead of providing a larger 
revenue stream to an autocrat, growth may instead help enemies of the regime or weaken 
regime  stalwarts.    Either  way,  growth  conceived  as  a  public  good  can  weaken  the 
incumbent.    The  interests  of  leadership  and  those  of  the  population  are  often  not  in 
alignment and autocratic regimes offer few mechanisms to correct that misalignment.   Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions 
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  Court  systems  in  authoritarian  regimes,  like  other  institutions  in  large 
selectorate-small winning coalition systems, are arranged to benefit a winning coalition 
and maximise the private wealth and political staying power of the autocrat.  We will 
explore  the  political  motivations  for  leaders  of  authoritarian  regimes  to  favour 
independent judiciaries in the context of the authoritarian ruler’s incentive to maintain 
discretion over what the courts can and cannot do, according to the strategy for political 
endurance.    Autocratic  leaders  often  have  expensive  political  agendas,  the  pursuit  of 
which  requires  substantial  financial  means.    Their  agenda  can  include  conflicts  with 
neighbouring states, the desire to accumulate personal wealth, and the need to bribe elites 
to buy their support.  Among the economic, financial and managerial dilemmas faced by 
autocrats that can motivate the creation of court systems are a need to attract investors, 
lack of revenue and failing credibility with regard to loan repayment, and failing central 
authority  due  to  the  inherent  contradictions  within  hierarchical  organisations  and  the 
private exploitation of information by regime representatives at lower levels. 
An  independent  judiciary  can  serve  different  functions  according  to  a  leader’s 
quest for political survival, a perspective which is different from the traditional argument 
that  relates  judicial  independence  to  the  rise  of  democratic  polities.    Even  when 
democratic  and  autocratic  regimes  employ  the  same  institutions  they  have  different 
effects on political rents, corruption and aggregate economic activity.  Both democratic 
and  authoritarian  regimes  require  judicial  independence  for  legitimacy,  but  the 
distribution  of  benefits  that  result  from  that  legitimation  differs  according  to  the 
constitution of the ruler’s support base and their strategy for political survival. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO AN AUTOCRAT’S  
MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS 
Authoritarians face three peculiar managerial dilemmas by virtue of the ‘above the 
law status’ enjoyed by the head of state.  That status limits the effectiveness of the state 
and its institutions because it implies the primacy of discretion over rules.  Building a 
court system restricts executive discretion but instead of weakening the regime it can 
actually  help  to  establish  a  stable  framework  for  regime  longevity.      First,  autocrats 
require investment and therefore  must create a legal system to  facilitate transactions.  
Second, they need to enhance revenue collection and credit, therefore they need a legal 
framework that holds financial intermediaries accountable for their private debts and for 
dealing equitably with citizens.  Third, they need to ferret out disobedience and non-
compliance by subordinates; a legal system that discloses the abuses of officials enhances 
the leader’s renown and ensures greater compliance from citizens.  Administrative courts 
can  make  the  state’s  administrative  apparatus  work  more  smoothly  to  ensure  that 
information  about  performance  and  malfeasance  is  uncovered.    Improved  loyalty  of 
administrative personnel is thereby attained along with a more contented populace.  
 
DILEMMA  1.  Property  Rights  and  Securing  Investment  Opportunities  for 
Distribution to Loyalists 
The centre of  the  legal reform agenda  for liberalisation is predictability in  the 
enforcement of property rights and contracts more generally.  Development practitioners Root and May 
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and political economists often refer to the mandate for secure property rights as “policy 
stability”—investors should be confident that a country’s policies regarding protection of 
assets will remain stable, and that their assets will not be confiscated.  Hernando de Soto 
(2000) and others have emphasised the importance of property rights reform, assuming 
an empirical correlation between rule of law and growth.  We accept that clear property 
rights  and  rule  of  law  reduce  transactional  friction,  and  facilitate  economic  activity.  
Insofar as they effectively enforce property rights and contracts, law courts serve as an 
institutional intermediary between commercial interests and the leadership of autocrat 
democratic regimes alike.     
  On the surface, promoting a safe investment environment may appear to foreign 
investors and policy advocates as a progressive liberal improvement.  The liberalisation 
of foreign investment, however, may be linked to strategies of coalition building that 
increase economic inequality and limit access to the political process.   The links between 
economic  and  political  liberalisation  are  more  difficult  to  establish  than  is  generally 
understood in the literature on modernisation.  
Business surveys based on investor perceptions typically correlate judicial reforms 
as  a  positive  step  towards  advancing  political  stability  and  political  opening.    But 
perceptions can overstate the synchronicity of institutional reforms to outcomes.  They 
disregard the prospect that judicial reforms may constitute a parallel system of regime 
legitimacy  that  rarely  serves  as  an  ultimate  check  on  the  power  of  the  executive.  
Although an obvious advantage exists for investors to seek and support the building of 
effective systems of commercial law around the world, an institutional design that may 
seem to be conducive for capital to potential investors, may have originated for entirely 
different political reasons and may buffet authoritarian regimes by enhancing the tools 
available to the incumbent to buy loyalty.   
A  tension  exists  between  the  financial  incentive  of  the  ruler  to  attract  foreign 
investment  and  the  autocrat’s  political  incentive  to  use  property  rights  selectively.  
Growth  is  only  indirectly  linked  to  the  ruler’s  revenue  stream.  From  the  autocrat’s 
perspective,  property  rights  are  another  tool  to  facilitate  political  and  economic 
enrichment  of  regime  followers  in  which  loyalty,  not  consumer  surpluses,  are  being 
optimised.    Foreign  investors  may  have  valuable  links  to  members  of  the  winning 
coalition, or they may have resources that help leaders circumvent rivals.  The ruler has 
an incentive to maintain a stable policy for enforcing property rights for financial elites 
because  avoiding  a  financial  crisis  is  essential  to  ensuring  regime  survival.  But  the 
autocrat  may  be  less  gracious  with  political  opponents,  and  may  direct  the  courts  to 
practice selective enforcement.  Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew is alleged to have used the 
courts  to  bankrupt  political  opponents  [Mauzy  and  Milne  (2002),  pp.  132-136].  The 
courts in Singapore were effective in processing commercial litigation and could identify 
the asset flows and resources of opponents, and then prosecute them with targeted tax 
enforcement.  Coupled with effective administrative follow-up, the efficiency of the court 
system made threats to opponents more credible.  The institutions that give Singapore a 
reputation  for  clean  business  practices  also  enables  its  leaders  to  intimidate  political 
opponents. 
In Indonesia when export and import markets were freed from controls, the best 
contracts often depend on partnerships with politically connected figures.  Fisman (2001) Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions 
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has quantified this dynamic in Indonesia after liberalisation and found that the value of 
political  connections  actually  increased  with  liberalisation.    The  distinction  between 
broad  growth  and  targeted  economic  interventions  that  reward  political  allies  with 
investment opportunities is difficult to observe in data, where increased activity may be 
revealed  in  growth  statistics  that  do  not  show  the  market  distortions  resulting,  for 
example,  from  the  reward  of  monopolies  to  political  supporters,  and  other  forms  of 
political rents collected in exchange for economic privileges.  With their control over 
natural resources Indonesia’s leadership can establish narrow coalitional foundations by 
selectively distributing market access as private benefits to regime supporters.  Resources 
relieve it of the need to develop a clean business environment to attract adequate capital 
to sustain a broad-based governing coalition.  Narrowing the winning coalition allows top 
leaders  to  keep  the  maximum  returns  for  their  own  consumption  and  to  ward  off 
rebellion.  
 
DILEMMA 2:  Financial Credibility and Debt Repayment  
Institutions that promote rules over discretion provide political leaders with access 
to private capital at lower cost than would otherwise be the case.  This insight is derived 
from the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), who focused on the advantage of rules 
over discretion in monetary policy and the related role of central banks.  In one extension 
of their model Root (1989) explores how the state can enjoy better credit terms, that is a 
lower  interest  rate,  when  able  to  borrow  from  intermediaries  that  are  subjected  to 
independent  courts  for  enforcement  of  non-payment  of  financial  arrears.    Such 
institutions reduce the costs of credit to the state by enabling leaders to draw upon the 
credibility of intermediary bodies that are themselves subject to a rule of law, whereas the 
head of state may not be.  Constraining sovereign discretion with regard to financial 
activity actually strengthens the ability of leaders to raise funds from private sources at 
more attractive rates than those available if the leader attempted to borrow directly from 
capital  markets. Surprisingly,  modern day regimes  with access to sources of external 
finance have weaker incentive to develop effective commercial courts, than the kings of 
early modern European states.  
  The necessity to secure funds for war drove much of the institutional innovation 
that occurred in feudal France and England.  In both cases, when the monarchs were 
above  the  law,  they  could  not  be  compelled  to  repay  their  debts,  and  so  had  more 
difficulty finding sources of credit.  As a result of royal discretion, monarchs enjoyed  
credit that was weaker than that of many of their subjects.  The kings’ onerous cost of 
capital could be mitigated by new institutional arrangements that benefited financiers and 
investors while ensuring a steady supply of government financing.   Kings could not 
borrow against discretion, so they were compelled to create a legal regime that remained 
after the personality of the king.   
  In England, the crown needed the revenues of elites and designed a court system 
that gave rise to a constitutional monarchy with strong protection of the property rights of 
the landholders and bondholders.  North and Weingast (1989) have pointed out that the 
English kings benefited from the rise of Parliament, by allowing it to raise taxes to fund 
the kings’ debts.  The British parliament was worried and wanted to prevent the king 
from  getting  money  through  sources  other  than  the  parliament  itself.    The  Glorious Root and May 
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Revolution placed limits on the Crown’s ability to unilaterally change the terms of its 
financial agreements, which enhanced its credibility. In exchange for purse strings, the 
king gained a source of revenue at lower cost than was available to any other government 
in Europe, which allowed England to become the master of the oceans and eventually of 
international commerce.  Strong domestic commercial law was necessary to generate the 
funds from which parliament could tax.  Ironically, when international donors provide 
bilateral or multilateral funds to present day autocrats, they reduce incentives for the 
government to provide strong domestic protection for commercial transactions.   
  In France, the intermediary was not a legislative body, but rather a private body 
chartered by the King with the privilege of collecting royal taxes.  The collectors often 
advanced their own funds to the Crown knowing they could access the king’s courts and 
army to draw upon the collective resources of the village communities, the guilds, and the 
provincial estates. The corporations were subject to the jurisdiction of the courts and 
could therefore offer credible financial commitments.  In return for official recognition 
and privileges, these corporate groups acted as bankers for the King, providing funds at 
lower rates than the king could find on his own.    
  Taxing peasants also required that their collective village property be protected, 
which  had  corollary  political  benefits.    By  granting  peasants  access  to  the  courts  to 
protect the tax base, the king used the courts to build up constituent support from groups 
that might otherwise be marginal.  His direct political objective was to supplant peasant 
allegiance from local seigneurs to the agents of the king.  Indirectly the subordination of 
seigniorial  authority  to  royal  supervision  may  have  had  unintended  revolutionary 
implications, creating a process that would lead towards the revolutionary events of 1789. 
The law of the king’s courts became a venue in which a contest between peasant villages 
and their traditional seigniorial masters could be waged.  The courts fanned the animosity 
towards seigniorial dues by hearing the grievances of peasant communities against their 
lords.  The contests became more adversarial by virtue of the fact that the seigneurs 
enjoyed tax exempt status, dating from the days they provided military service to the 
king.  But by the eighteenth century, it was the taxes on the peasantry that financed the 
king’s wars.  In Great Britain, by contrast, the lords shouldered the burden of paying local 
taxes, and their authority grew in proportion to the burdens of national security that they 
bore for the entire community.  Hence, there was more justification of the English lord’s 
economic status and their enterprises gained protection in national law.  
Today the heads of government rarely enjoy incentives similar to the monarchs of 
eighteenth  century  Europe  to  protect  the  enterprises  of  productive  sectors  of  the 
population because they can substitute international loans for capital drawn from sources 
of domestic taxation.  This is true for both developed and developing countries.  For 
developing countries, international financing often means an absence of a commitment to 
protecting the property rights of majorities, in favour of selectively distributed economic 
privileges that provide a loyalty premium to the head of state.  If she is lucky, natural 
resources such as oil or diamonds may be enough to finance the regime, and the messy 
business of negotiating tax revenue can be avoided.  International financing from the 
multilateral  development  banks  and  donors  is  another  attractive  source  of  funding, 
allowing the ruler autonomy from society.  If the regime does require tax revenue to 
survive, a unique set of incentives arises that can lay the groundwork for democratic Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions 
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transitions.  This transformation can be seen in the practice of effective government by 
China’s KMT after it lost the mainland.   
While the change process occurred at different rates, both France and England’s 
innovations  in  the  institutions  of  participatory  governance  were  driven  by  the  fiscal 
necessity of the state. With the advent of the international financial institutions, domestic 
taxation  is  not the only option for securing government  resources.  Foreign debt has 
caused further rifts between rulers and citizens, as foreign policy concessions made by 
dictators are often granted by developing countries to donors in exchange for extended 
credit. 
 
DILEMMA 3: Secrecy, Central Authority, and Administrative Discipline 
The secrecy inherent in the extremely hierarchical nature of autocratic regimes 
generates  internal  contradictions  regarding  the  use  and  abuse  of  information  by 
administrators at lower levels of the regime.  Effective authoritarian governance requires 
that information be passed up and down the ladder of authority; however, there tends to 
be an overload of information at the top that creates opportunities to hoard information at 
the  lower  level,  progressively  diminishing  the  authority  of  the  ruler.    Low  level 
administrators  can  strip  regime  assets  to  create  personal  fiefdoms  obscured  from  the 
purview of central government actors.    
  Layers of authority exist between the head of  state and local administrators, 
creating ample opportunity for orders to be confused or mishandled.  Judicial decisions 
and censures from senior officials are further confused by protests, excuses and appeals 
pitched  to  central  authorities.    Administrative  complexity  overlapping  responsibilities 
slows  communication  and  results  in  the  loss  of  timely  information,  facilitating  the 
stripping of state assets for private gain.  
  Many  autocrats  depend  on  local  notables  whose  resources  constitute  an 
independent power base.  They must be co-opted into supporting the regime, but their 
loyalty can never be counted upon.  Imbued with local biases they seek to guard local or 
regional privileges; their scope for hiding information and action is considerable. The 
policy decisions that are directed towards them are often construed in ways that fit their 
own needs.  There is no easy way to solve this problem of local non-conformity; creating 
administrative  law  and  using  central  courts  to  watch  over  local  communities  risks 
confrontation.  Military force is always an option but it complicates the prospects of 
future local cooperation. Inevitably when local big men are well entrenched money spent 
locally will further perpetuate their control over local patronage networks.  The leader 
can demarcate areas of local jurisdiction that fall under central control and slowly erode 
localised power, but the risks of hidden action and information will persist.   
  Kenneth Arrow’s insights concerning “hidden information” and “hidden action” 
in  corporate  structures  [Arrow  (1979)]  offer  useful  parallels  to  the  information 
asymmetries in authoritarian governments.  As the agent of the stockholders, corporate 
management may pursue a project it knows to be unprofitable if it produces perks or 
salary benefits that management can enjoy.  Likewise, an agent of the government may 
distort information (hidden information) about the performance of government policies 
and avoid passing along information about local economic conditions or the potential for 
governmental  revenue  generation.    Agents  can  trade  on  information  about  planned Root and May 
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government policies or projects (hidden action), striking black market side deals with 
other administrators or with private parties.  Local officials become adept at stripping the 
value of the government assets at their disposal to earn private profits.  
  The autocrat may create or reinvent the courts to address this principal-agent 
problem to prevent the erosion of power and impose supervision on agents, in order to 
constrain their ability to conceal information for their private benefit.   The administrative 
discipline administered by the courts helps to build legitimacy for the regime because the 
visible effects of re-centralising authority are perceived as reducing corruption to the 
benefit of society, recovering lost economic surpluses, and removing secondary officials 
who  have  distorted  rule  enforcement  by  distributing  opportunities  to  their  own  local 
networks. 
  A significant literature has emerged that attributes the fall of the Soviet Union to 
the  loss  of  hierarchical  discipline  at  lower  levels  [Frye  and  Shleifer  (1996)].
23  The 
corruption that was unleashed after the end of the Cold War was just the extension of a 
process that had already been underway.  Local officials had been hiding information 
about the efficacy of policies from the central government and taking hidden actions that 
enabled them to gain control over government assets.  Only the local officials knew about 
side-deals amongst each other.  Today, one of the most trenchant criticisms levelled at 
Communist Party officials in China is that lower-ranking representatives are using their 
authority  to  collect  rents  such  as  fees  for  services  at  the  local  level,  and  then  not 
transferring that revenue upward.  Resources are being diverted away from the centre 
making  it  difficult  for  Beijing  to  provide  government  services  demanded  by  local 
populations. 
  While information asymmetries and corruption have been acknowledged in the 
literature as a problem for central governments, monitoring is the only recommended 
solution.  While monitoring is a traditional function of court systems, monitoring alone 
does not contribute to the liberalisation of the regime. Typically, monitoring is a way to 
exert  central  authority  over  the  periphery.    A  side  effect  may  be  new  avenues  of 
contestation, but that is not the goal of such reforms. An incentive structure based on 
bureaucratic competition may offer the best hope for a sustainable path to transparency 
and administrative unity.   
  Alternatively, the autocrat’s utility may not require that administrative discipline 
be enforced.   A weak court system and lack of transparency allow rulers more options 
for amassing private wealth.  Although the surplus or productivity of the economy is 
compromised, the distributional impact may still be favourable to regime longevity.  As 
mentioned  earlier  with  the  Indonesian  example,  autocrats  may  overlook  opacity  and 
corruption in order to guarantee that the  state intervenes on behalf of investors, thus 
ensuring central economic control.  If the autocrat does not need the courts to secure 
income or reward the winning coalition, resources will be diverted away from the courts 
and they will suffer from under-funding.  When courts are appended to stand-alone legal 
ministries, they rarely have funding to undertake their core responsibilities and are often 
prone to bribe-taking, ultimately undermining their legitimacy.  
 
2Frye and Shleifer found in a survey of Moscow shop owners that only 50 percent of respondents felt 
that the courts would “defend their rights if the government grossly violated their property rights” [Frye and 
Shleifer (1996:5)]. Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions 
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CAUSAL FACTORS TOWARDS ORDERED LIBERTY: LINKAGES   
BETWEEN POLTICAL DISCIPLINE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
What is the incentive of an autocracy to adequately finance the courts? In some 
authoritarian regimes such as South Korea during the 1960s and 70s, the courts were 
under direct supervision and control of security forces, and in fact became an arm of the 
state  security  apparatus.  Paradoxically  leaders  that  create  judicial  institutions  that 
improve internal security for defense against enemies of the state can use these same 
institutions to establish effective courts that enjoy the respect of the population. In weak 
states  legal  institutions  are  viewed  as  protecting  the  private  interests  of  the  wealthy.  
Attaching the court system to the security function has a strong effect on the ability of the 
courts to function effectively.  The security apparatus of the state is the most important 
disciplinary agent of an authoritarian regime. Ironically, a connection with the regime’s 
security function may be the source of funding that allows the courts to do disregard the 
power of external influence over contract enforcement, and to establish a reputation for 
professionalism.  This  relationship  explains  in  large  part  the  reputation  for 
professionalism enjoyed by the judges of South Korea during the martial law period.  The 
courts of Nazi Germany enjoyed the same high status. Court systems that are effective at 
disciplining political opponents are likely to be well-resourced and efficient at enforcing 
property rights and commercial legislation.  Judges that are directly responsible for the 
survival of the regime are likely to enjoy greater esteem than judges who are members of 
stand alone judicial ministries that tend to be under-funded and prone to corruption.  If 
judicial  personnel  are  well-paid,  they  have  little  incentive  to  hoard  information  and 
collect rents that divert economic activity. 
  The security connection also comes into play after court decisions are made, 
when enforcement is required to render court decisions credible.  Enforcement is easily 
provided if the courts are attached to the security apparatus, but when courts are stand-
alone institutions, their authority can be circumvented because of inadequate policing and 
funding. 
The courts can rarely question if the basis for the regime is legitimate because 
doing so may lead to questions of the legitimacy of the court itself. Judges are aware that 
it is best to let others decide politically dangerous cases because in authoritarian systems 
the  courts  will  generally  be  the  losers  in  contests  with  the  head  of  state.  Judicial 
leadership  of  challenges  to  the  regime  can  be  ended  by  retiring  judicial  leaders.  
Moreover,  potential  judicial  leaders  would  generally  lack  authority  over  subordinate 
court staff.  
Most  non-Western  legal  systems  do  not  base  their  authority  upon  universal 
principles.  Without universal principles, the courts are rarely if ever in a position to 
challenge the final authority of the regime, in spite of judicial independence in other 
spheres of civil or contract law. For example, when Thaksin was elected prime minister 
of Thailand, the opposition questioned his eligibility to rule based on accusations of tax 
evasion.  The Constitutional Court ruled in Thaksin’s favour, arguing that the electorate 
already knew of these charges and elected him anyway, and it was not the mandate of the 
court to contradict the electoral mandate of the population.  In the Philippines, Marcos 
declared  martial  law,  which  the  courts  accepted  on  the  grounds  that  he  had  been  a Root and May 
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democratically elected president. This initial rubber stamp became a turning point in the 
loss of independence for the courts, which had previously been perceived as meritocratic 
and professional.  Jensen (1997: 82) explains: 
As he expanded the role of the military, Marcos limited the power of the judiciary.  
To ensure that his policies were implemented as he saw necessary, Marcos needed to 
curb the independence and review powers of the Supreme Court.  Directly or indirectly, 
Marcos exerted pressure on the Supreme Court to give him a free rein; in turn, the court 
exercised a great deal of self-regulation to avoid confrontation with Marcos. 
Frequently, a dual reality develops in authoritarian regimes in which a separation 
occurs between the regime’s questionable  moral legitimacy and its effective performance 
of  routine  daily  civic  functions,  further  reducing  the  court’s  capacity  to  effectively 
challenge the moral legitimacy of the regime.  But the existence of judicial review may 
create a space in which the forces for contesting the regime will gather and in which they 
will learn how to coordinate using tools provided by the regime itself to later challenge 
the status quo.   
       
THE LAW AND REGIME CHANGE 
This  section  explores  how  court  systems  can  play  the  dual  role  of  protecting 
property rights, ensuring smooth civic processes such as marriage and divorce, as well as 
sustaining  the  legitimacy  of  autocratic  rule.  When  considering  how  the  courts  can 
contribute to political liberalisation, it is not just the institutional framework that matters, 
but rather that legal reform is part of a broader context of social reform.  The courts 
mirror that larger process, whether they enhance or retard it.  The courts can have a  dual 
nature, providing legalistic justification for regime legitimacy and the ruler’s arbitrary 
discipline of political opponents, while remaining more independent when dealing with 
contract or family law.   
  The courts can play a stabilising role by providing access to administrative law 
processes that can release tensions and instabilities before they erupt. The evolution of 
institutions  does  not  always  optimise  broad  social  welfare.  Political  and  economic 
evolution is a process of adaptation and survival in the face of external pressure and 
competition,  and  the  result  is  often  policy  volatility.    In  newly  emerging  states, 
particularly,  weak  institutions  can  cost  elites  the  opportunity  to  reap  the  rewards  of 
power.    Judicial  institutions  adjust  to  an  equilibrium  strategy,  facilitating  enough 
economic  activity  to  optimise  resources  for  the  winning  coalition,  while  serving  the 
ruler’s political security.  
By providing a mechanism for resolving administrative disputes, judicial venues to 
resolve grievances can release volatility in the system.  If the courts support the denial of 
citizens’ right to assemble, mobilise, and organise for political purposes, open and inclusive 
administrative processes are unlikely to stimulate long term political reform.  Alternatively, in 
the courts’ role of reinforcing central authority, the courts may provide a venue to expose 
contradictions that can lead to disintegration of the regime.  In this case the courts rarely 
initiate change, but rather provide a forum to voice changes already underway.   
Political discourse may or may not evolve in an administrative court system that is 
primarily used to impose supervision on local leaders, as in China.  At the base, citizens 
may perceive a dual court system as one in which grievances can be legitimately aired Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions 
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and potentially resolved, giving the appearance of inclusivity and effectiveness, which 
contributes to regime legitimacy.
34 Autocrats that rule inclusively with a combination of 
strong political security and some access to arbitration to resolve local disputes may be 
able to cushion their rule from shocks in the economy or external environment. 
 
Dualism and Inclusivity as Steady-state Equilibrium 
As noted earlier, today’s autocrats have several channels to circumvent reliance on 
domestic taxation to secure revenues for the regime.  By far the most efficient is the 
possession of resources demanded by world markets that can be controlled by regime 
leaders, such as oil or diamonds.    Without the fiscal incentive to protect taxable assets of 
regime citizens, the process of political liberalisation will stall.  A second opportunity to 
rule without domestic accountability is made available through bilateral or multilateral 
bank  lending  to  the  sovereign.    The  loans  most  frequently  benefit  the  incumbent 
leadership  and  the  interests  they  represent,  despite  lending  guidelines  established  by 
international law.  The possession of revenues that come from sources that enhance an 
autocrat’s independence from accountability to societal groups allows the leadership to 
shape those groups according to its own interests.  The resource curse,
45 like the foreign 
aid  curse,  gives  rise  to  large  selectorate-small  winning  coalition  systems  in  which 
political competition is stifled and some measure of judicial independence is lost.   
   Regimes that rely on peasants or other marginal groups for legitimacy do have 
an incentive to provide access to the legal system.  The opportunity for poor farmers to 
appeal to the courts, however, does not imply that the autocracy will disintegrate; in fact 
it is more likely to contribute to stability by giving rulers ways to supplant the traditional 
powers of local elites.  Thaksin in Thailand became well-known for programmes that 
benefited the poor. He did this expressly to circumvent local patronage networks that 
empowered local leaders.  Thaksin had centralised political funding, letting big money 
politics overcome local political influence; once their power base was attenuated local 
leaders had to support Thaksin or risk losing elections.   
  In China, the Communist Party has been strengthened by increased growth, but 
as a result of dynamic economic activity, the coalitional structure shifted toward a new 
class of financial elites, forcing a formal change in the Party Constitution.  China scholar 
Hongying  Wang  discussed  the  CCP’s  adaptation  strategy  in  a  recent  interview  with 
Fareed Zakaria  [Wang (2006)]: 
…the  CCP,  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  has  reinvented  itself.  That’s  the  key; 
they’re…not  the  Communist  Party  that  you  know  about  or  people  idealise  about. 
There’s  nothing  communist  about  it  except  that  it  is  a  one-party  system  and  it  is 
determined to do everything, including changing its own nature to stay in power. The 
new principle as it is written in the Party Constitution now—the Party represents the 
most advanced production force, which means the capitalists or the capital owners; it 
represents the most advanced culture, which means professionals, intellectuals, and 
advanced “everybody’s interests,” which is just … covering every aspect. 
 
3Jeane Kirkpatrick subscribed to the notion that the most resilient autocratic regimes are the most 
totalitarian.  This doctrine was clearly discredited after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
4See Michael Ross’s 1999 article “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse” for a review of the 
inverse relationship between natural resource endowments and growth. Root and May 
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The adaptation of judicial independence within a limited sphere of activity does 
not imply that political liberalisation will ultimately result.  Local dispute resolution may 
contribute to growth as a strategy to ensure continued centralised authority, but growth 
may also increase inequality, which works to the advantage of the ruler.  Inequality can 
be exploited by the autocrat to further cement control by increasing the loyalty premium, 
the ruler can extract from the winning coalition. When being cut off from the winning 
coalition  means  mediocre access to resources, the cost of  gaining loyalty is reduced.  
Thus, members of the winning coalition have more to lose when the society is more 
unequal – loyalty can thus be purchased more inexpensively.    
The courts can become effective as vehicles for the activism of opposition only 
once the regime has already started to weaken.  Hongying Wang continues: 
…people [are] looking at their neighbours, their urban cousins getting rich…Some 
of these protests are about local environment issues, …unemployment…about half 
of [college students] them end up graduating not immediately finding jobs. … I 
think on the one hand it does represent a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the 
government; on the other hand I do not think in the near future it is going to 
generate the kind of collapse that people are sometimes talking about, because the 
Chinese Communist Party has been very smart from its own point of view in that 
you can protest as long as you guys do not get organised. You can talk all you 
want, so there is much more freedom now in China in terms of people’s ability to 
express their discontent—just do not get organised. And the problem is if you are 
thinking of a revolution or any kind of meaningful upheaval without organisation 
these protests are not going to cause any major change. 
The Chinese example demonstrates that the granting of limited freedoms can be a 
strategy for legitimising the regime without sacrificing central authority.  As an instrument of 
that  authority,  the  courts  can  still  rule  in  favour  of  local  plaintiffs  in  cases  of  low-level 
corruption without jeopardising political security of central leadership.  Judgments that favour 
selectorate members reduce the threat of potential challengers from within to the winning 
coalition.  In China, for example, Jiang Zemin rarely challenged the Shanghai Gang and his 
allies among the princelings, the children of revolutionary leaders, leaving behind a legacy of 
high level corruption that his successor Hu Jintao is trying to erase.   In effect, by becoming 
the party of the haves, the capitalists and the bourgeoisie, the Communist party has eliminated 
any meaningful and serious threats to the Party.  
 
Revolution or Evolution  
Further research on the nature of court cases in China is needed to determine the extent 
to  which  access  to  administrative  courts  is  giving  a  voice  to  a  new  set  of  democratic 
challenges to the legitimacy of the CCP. Even if it is, this discourse is not initially dangerous 
until the regime starts to  weaken due to other inherent contradictions or pressures.  It is 
possible that the growing inequality in China constitutes such a contradiction.  The courts 
could potentially be used to expose underlying instability in the coalitional structure that could 
lead to dramatic political change.  Dualism may serve as an adaptation that provides regime 
stability, but because the incentives of autocratic rulers may diverge dramatically from the 
interests of society, courts that were originally designed to facilitate and lengthen authoritarian 
rule may actually become weapons against the regime [Moustafa (2006)]. Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions 
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This occurred in Old Regime France, as de Toqueville argued.  By supplanting 
the reciprocal bonds between lord and peasants with central bureaucratic codes, the 
monarchy initiated a revolutionary process that ultimately led to the regime’s demise.  
In The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856) de Tocqueville contends that it was the 
Crown’s attempts at reform which “roused the people by trying to offer them relief.”  
The shift to a rule-based system of centralised authority that weakened the Seigneurie 
created  political  space  in  which  reforms  became  “practices  thanks  to  which  the 
government  completed  the  people’s  revolutionary  education”.    Inequality  of  status, 
symbolised  by  residual  feudal  dues  owed  to  local  seigneurs,  became  suspect. 
Seigneurial roles for the local community had become tenuous, and their tax-exempt 
status  became  more  odious  as  their  authority  became  more  residual.    The  courts 
provided  a  venue  to  air  long-standing  grievances  against  seigneurial  exactions  and 
domination [Root (1985)]. 
The  White  Revolution  initiated  by  the  Shah  of  Iran  in  1963  provides  a  more 
contemporary example of reforms that highlighted deep-seated inequalities to initiate a 
revolutionary process.  The Shah hoped that economic growth would provide a substitute 
and ultimately a source of social coherence, but growth created conflict instead [Root 
(2006)].    Opportunities  for  capital  accumulation  were  linked  to  a  system  of  social 
exclusion.    Meaningful  policy  participation  was  barred;  democratic  and  meritocratic 
channels  of  access  within  the  state  were  not  built.    In  contrast  to  the  anti-religious 
sentiment of the Enlightenment in the French Revolution, Khomeini’s Iranian revolution 
in response to the Shah used the banner of organised Islam to provide a framework for 
the democratic political challenge.  While the regime enjoyed early popular support and 
made  social  gains  in  terms  of  political  participation,  rules  and  regulations  promoting 
access to capital for new enterprises not controlled by the government are stiffly opposed 
by the incumbent leadership. The Revolution’s agenda did not emphasise eliminating 
corruption,  or  establishing  an  institutional  and  legal  capacity  necessary  for  a  market 
economy. As a result, Iran’s productivity declined after religious rule was established and 
has stagnated ever since.   
  Instead of economic conflicts, the courts in the Soviet Union exposed a different 
set of contradictions after the Communist leadership signed the Helsinki Accords.  The 
Russians were subjected to human rights criteria that undermined the legitimacy of the 
regime and gave the U.S. a wedge to impose constraints.  One unintended consequence 
benefited Russian Jews by allowing them to migrate to Israel, but the favouritism they 
enjoyed led other Russians to ask why they too did not enjoy similar rights; the Accords 
had an unintended subversive effect that set the stage for Soviet decline as domestic 
discontent was empowered with a universal criteria with which to measure their own 
leaders.   
  The Iranian and Russian examples provide evidence to support the notion that a 
connection exists between the role of the courts and regime disintegration, but not that 
growth or democracy will necessarily result, or that a formalised democratic constitution 
will necessarily increase the welfare of society.   For two centuries the revolutionary goal 
of responsibility and equal burden sharing had not been met in France. Informal norms 
continued to reinforce structures of elite domination including domination over entire 
sectors of the modern economy.  Root and May 
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The  celebrated  case  of  England’s  transition  to  democracy,  led  by  the  rise  of 
Parliament, could be described as more of an evolutionary process than a revolutionary 
one.    An  often  overlooked  aspect  of  this  evolution  is  that  for  the  Parliament  to  be 
effective it depended on the ability of the head of state to assert sovereignty over the 
entire kingdom.  In England it was often said that the King was strongest in Parliament 
because it simplified getting the assent of the entire nation.  The French king’s rule over a 
mosaic nation had to employ much more cumbersome procedures to gain cooperation 
from his subjects.  A considerable waste of resources resulted. 
  In  systems  with  diminished  winning  coalitions  and  poor  institutional 
infrastructure,  resistance  to  reform  of  legal  institutions  is  well  focused  and  easy  to 
organise.  That opposition can come from entrenched social groups whose interests are 
threatened  by  judicial  independence.  Opposition  can  also  come  from  within  the 
bureaucracy.  Legal ministries might resist the formalisation of commercial law, as a 
rules-over-discretion  approach  would  directly  challenge  the  legitimacy  of  the  regime.  
Finance ministries may be allied with reform, but they have no jurisdiction to promote it.  
In such cases, a Common Law approach may be much more effective at instilling viable 
procedures  for  enforcing  contracts  and  mediating  civil  and  commercial  disputes.    As 
individual cases are arbitrated, precedents are set and legal efficiency can slowly evolve.  
This  reform  strategy  has  been  proposed  as  a  possible  mechanism  to  build  up  legal 
capacity in Africa, where legal ministries resist reform efforts because it would constitute 
a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the autocrat’s rule. The French kings of the twelfth 
century  astutely  managed  the  diversity  of  regional  legal  institutions  not  by  abruptly 
abolishing them, but by appointing a royal representative as local supervisor, facilitating 
a slower transition to a uniform legal code, less threatening to local interests.  The danger 
with moving reforms too fast is that the contradictions inherent in the regime and the 
incompatibility between formal and informal institutions can create a backlash situation 
in which resistance to reform increases, further entrenching authoritarian rule.   
 
The Law and Emerging Loyalty to the State 
The  institutionalist  argument  for  legal  reform  that  seeks  to  replicate  formal 
structures  with  effective  enforcement  of  commercial  law  must  be  combined  with  the 
political  argument  that  takes  the  ruler’s  strategy  for  political  survival  into  account.  
Building a rule of law  is part of the political process in  which the state acquires its 
legitimacy as upholder of the law, and in which the organs of state power are viewed as 
existing  to  enforce  the  law.    The  first  national  institutions  were  identified  with  the 
monarch  who  embodied  the  nation  morally  and  politically.    The duty  of  the  king  to 
uphold the law became the moral justification for political leadership.  Eventually the 
monarchs of Europe accepted that political power must be defined by law, so that by the 
eighteenth century, most administrative and legal matters were handled by professional 
administrators who acted independently of royal prerogative.  Paradoxically, it was the 
strong political identification with the monarch that enabled the growing independence of 
government administration.   
Qualitative studies of the origin of the rule of law in Western Europe have shown 
that the existence of courts does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of the supremacy 
of law, nor to the emergence of an authority which will enforce the law [Strayer (1970), Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions 
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p. 7]. Rather change in judicial systems, as an adaptive process like evolution, does not 
produce an optimal and consistent outcome such as a recognisable liberal regime. The 
legitimacy of leadership must first be established before the courts will be viewed as 
upholders of a society based on law.  In Western Europe the development of a society of 
law was an integral part of the political process of state building. The courts emerged as 
institutions of law that strengthened the political identity of the group; local identity fused 
with loyalty to the state and ultimately with nationalism. This fundamental aspect of the 
European tradition—the emphasis on national cohesion embodied by a unifying national 
symbol—has been surprisingly embraced by the Chinese.  In this case, the Communist 
Party functions as that symbol rather than the monarchy.  The Chinese are only now just 
beginning  to  create  law  schools  and  to  train  judges,  fifty  years  after  the  process  of 
building a modern state began, and three decades after pro-market reforms were initiated.   
For the courts to function in any society there must be an ability to distinguish 
between public and private—a distinction that is only beginning to take root in the habits 
and beliefs of the population in many emerging nations.   In many developing countries 
basic  security  comes  from  pre-state  organisations—family,  neighbours  and  the  local 
strongman—not from the state.  In many patrimonial African regimes that emerged after 
the Colonialists departed, the strongest loyalties were to family and persons rather than to 
abstractions  such  as  the  national  state.  Instead  of  providing  enduring  institutions  to 
deliver efficient administration, the strategy of political leaders was to gain control over 
existing  governments  or  over  residual  colonial  institutions  for  purposes  of  personal 
aggrandizement,  and  they  accordingly  used  the  courts  to  protect  the  income  and 
prerogatives of the leadership.  Latin America’s courts functioned primarily to protect the 
private interests of the wealthy.  In both examples the existence of courts does not lead to 
the acceptance of the supremacy of law.   
Communist  regimes,  by  comparison  with  African  and  Latin  American  legal 
systems, more effectively laid a foundation for broad public acceptance of the institutions 
of government.  Communist societies deliberately avoided distinguishing between the 
private  interests  of  citizens  and  the  public  concerns  of  the  state.  They  elevated  the 
interests of the state above all else and so dissolved primordial loyalties and networks of 
clientage and dependency that still exist in many former-colonial regimes.   
  The  desire  of  the  poorer  classes  for  security  and  good  government  in 
authoritarian  countries  has  been  constantly  frustrated  by  the  fact  that  leaders  sought 
stability  and  longevity  by  appealing  to  the  propertied  classes.    This  process  of  mass 
identification  with  the  symbols  of  state  power  has  often  failed  to  occur  in  many 
authoritarian regimes for both external and internal reasons. Many leaders during the 
Cold War cooperated with the geopolitical strategies of the major industrial powers in 
exchange  for  the  resources  needed  to  gain  the  approval  of  the  privileged  minorities.  
Governments  could  secure  power  without  providing  public  services  such  as  broadly 
available law, security, health and sanitation that citizens demand in exchange for loyalty 
and  resources.  Necessary  improvements  in  legal  processes  could  be  postponed.  As  a 
result loyalty to the state must vie with other loyalties. The state, without real impact on 
the quality of people’s lives, enjoys only limited respect.   
  The national leaders of many third world nations have little in common with the 
citizenry.  Local  leaders,  sometimes  members  of  politically  suspect  groups  who  are Root and May 
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involved with day to day security, are not recognised by government to create judicial 
institutions. Examples such as Hezbollah or the war lords of Afghanistan come to mind. 
During  European  development  the  more  competent  local  leaders  were  the  first  to 
establish courts and other instruments of state power.  But many leaders today derive 
their fiscal capacity to rule from resources that are independent of the people who are 
being governed.  Autocrats often survive because they have access to external resources 
and  as  noted  base  the  stability  of  their  regime  on  the  support  of  the  propertied  and 
politically privileged groups; their political survival strategies differ fundamentally from 
democratically  elected  leaders.    External  processes  triggered  by  the  Cold  War  which 
provided  external  funding  for  compliant  dictators,  and  the  resource  curse  which  put 
resources into the hands of government elites, all interfered with the emergence of strong 
and  accountable  national  states.    External  resources,  generally  available  only  to  the 
incumbent leadership, lessen the efficacy of domestic political challengers, reducing the 
incentives  for  incumbents  to  be  concerned  with  structural  reforms  and  institution 
building.     
The  larger  process  of  building  political  legitimacy  for  the  instruments  of  state 
power will ultimately determine if the courts emerge as upholders of the supremacy of 
law.  The legitimacy of the state determines the legitimacy of its institutions, such as the 
courts.    As  part  of  the  basis  for  state  building,  the  judicial  system  will  not  be  truly 
effective until the other basic institutional components—both formal and informal—are 
already in place.  The integrity of the courts and of the laws they uphold will flourish 
only once loyalty to the state becomes an item of faith for large majorities as opposed to 
small  winning  coalitions.  To  sustain  such  faith,  legal  reforms  must  be  incentive 
compatible  across  many  dimensions—financing,  credibility,  security,  and  general 
welfare—with the ruler’s strategy for survival and the interests of population at large. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS FOR LINKING LEGAL REFORM     
WITH POLITICAL LIBERALISATION 
Many of today’s autocracies have court systems that are better organised than in 
the past.  It remains an open question whether more effective courts will produce greater 
loyalty to the ruler and to the state or whether they will be a forum for opposition and for 
the replacement of the existing regime.  
To assist policymakers scholars must work toward mapping the characteristics of 
courts in regimes that have effectively implemented growth-enhancing institutions, those 
that have working democracies and the rare cases in which legal and institutional reforms 
do in fact lead to growth and democracy.  We must ask when these are two separate 
issues and when they converge.   
For  the  courts  to  facilitate  social  change  they  must  be  venues  that  encourage 
innovation and competition.  The courts are rarely created for this purpose and only serve 
this purpose indirectly.   Courts  must actively protect innovators instead of punishing 
them.  This must be distinguished from the simple protection of property rights, which 
will  inevitably  focus  on  protecting  elites  to  the  exclusion  of  more  marginal 
constituencies.  The Coase Theorem that stresses reduction of transaction costs is not 
very helpful in the context of developing economies since the poor lack the resources to 




Imposing formal institutional structures on a society with incompatible traditions 
is unlikely to succeed in bringing about lasting reform.  Courts in the U.S. derive their 
authority from a constitutional mandate to interpret legislation.  In most other societies 
the courts are an extension of the executive function.  Without the balancing effect of the 
other branches, the scope for reform via the courts is limited. We tend to assume that 
court and legal reform along these lines is a healthy, inevitable pattern of evolution that 
contributes to human betterment—others see reform as a means to an end, an end for 
which there may be better means to attain those goals.   
  Western legal systems are distinguished by a very sharp  distinction between 
private and public law.  The expectation of citizens from Western legal traditions is that a 
neutral framework in which both systems (private and public) of the law can coexist.  
China and other communist countries may be very rule bound with strong public and 
civic law.  Apparently there was more “civil law” in China than the first generation of 
Western scholars identified because they assumed that civic law implies a separation 
from public law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The links between the judicial institutions and liberalisation is ambiguous at best.  
Even when the courts enforce property rights, contract and family law, judicial power 
may  block  innovation  and  competition  by  selectively  promoting  rights  of  established 
firms  and  technologies  they  control.    Underneath  the  rules  and  procedures  of  formal 
constitutions and codes of conduct, the courts can be used to protect incumbent wealth.  
Governments may employ courts to improve contract enforcement, loan repayment and 
bureaucratic discipline and still not allow citizens the right to assemble, mobilise and 
organise for political purposes. As already noted, in autocracy the inclusiveness of legal 
rights and protection does not need to be any larger than the coalition that the leader 
cultivates to elevate her political power.  Leaders who do not depend on broad coalitions 
have numerous ways to extend their tenure in office by manipulating judicial institutions.  
For this reason it is necessary for future analysis to distinguish between those functions of 
the  court  that  advance  or  retard  democratic  change.  It  is  not  just  the  institutional 
framework that matters, but rather that legal reform is part of a broader context of social 
reform.  The judicial system will lack legitimacy until the other instruments of national 
sovereignty win citizen acceptance. 
Modern autocrats in contemporary Russia and Kazakhstan have learned how to 
prevent people from coordinating political activism or dissent while at the same time 
encouraging foreign investment.  The key point for the literature to absorb is that the 
interests of leaders can be divorced from the national interests of the populations they 
lead.    Modern  autocrats  can  actually  decrease  the  probability  of  revolt  by  being 
successful economically, so we must learn to distinguish between those that come to 
power in existing arrangements and those leaders who pose a revolutionary challenge that 
will  alter  the  regime’s  coalitional  foundations  and  expand  the  winning  coalition  by 
increasing  the  provision  of  public  goods.    Such  leaders  will  inevitably  undertake 
revolutionary transformations of the legal system.  But so far we have not found any 
reason to believe that judicial institutionalisation makes democratic reform more likely.  Root and May 
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Turkey  provides  an  example  of  the  judiciary  working  closely  with  the  military  to 
modernised  the  country,  and  the  implication  is  clearly  that  judicial  power  conflicts 
directly  with  the  emergence  of  democratic  forces  which  contain  strong  anti-modern 
elements.    In  Pakistan  and  Israel,  migrants  displaced  indigenous  populations  and 
introduced national judicial systems where none had previously existed.  In both of these 
cases, the national judicial system  was used to undermine the democratic  will of the 
indigenous population.   
There may be particular institutional innovations that contribute to democratic reform, 
and we need to identify those and distinguish them from the general process of legal reform.  
It may be possible that leaders can reduce the likelihood of democratic revolt by providing 
courts  that  offer  citizens  redress  to  the  performance  of  the  administrative  functions  of 
government.  We have also discussed in this paper that corruption in the courts can increase 
when the judicial system is under-funded so that even if the judges have lifetime tenure, their 
credibility can be undermined simply by underpaying them.  A weak financial base can make 
it possible for the courts to be intimidated by non-state actors.   
Our analysis indicates that the courts are part of the fabric of broader societal 
change but can under restricted conditions precipitate change.  Further research on what 
these conditions are will help define how reform of the courts is interwoven with larger 
social movements, and whether we can consider legal reform as a driving force, or an 
important incidental.   
 
APPENDIX I 
The Centre for Public Integrity, Global Integrity Project 
Future research is needed to judicial institutionalisation with political outcomes 
such as democracy.  Some measures can be found in Freedom House or Polity IV, which 
distinguishes democracies from authoritarian regimes.  The relationships between these 
outcomes  can  be  tested  against  institutional  variables  that  are  quantifiable,  such  as 
whether  judges  have  lifetime  tenure,  how  they  are  selected,  what  legal  systems  they 
employ, and how long cases remain in the dockets before being resolved. What are the 
mechanisms available to the head of state to circumvent the courts and reserve rights in 
the  ruler  or  the  state’s  prerogative?    How  does  the  efficiency  of  regulatory  and 
enforcement agencies limit the efficacy of the law?  What measures can be developed 
that illustrate the understaffing of the courts?     
The Centre for Public Integrity is developing a framework to begin to answer these 
questions.  The “Public Integrity Index” [The Centre (2004)] assesses the institutional 
mechanisms  that  safeguard  against  corruption,  breaking  the  data  down  into  three 
categories that measure the existence of anti-corruption mechanisms such as laws and 
courts, the effectiveness of those mechanisms, and the access that citizens have to public 
information to hold their government accountable.  Peer reviewed scorecards assess both 
formal laws and procedures as well as informal “in practice” measures for each subject 
area.
56 Researchers still lack data to investigate the empirical link between the judicial 
 
5A  complete  list  of  indicators  as  well  as  the  full  methodology  for  the  reports  is  available  at 
http://www.globalintegrity.org/default.aspx?act=10. Appendix I for this paper lists the questions related to the 
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system and democratisation.  Once quantitative cross country data are available, policy-
makers will have better tools to engineer more accountable governance through legal 
reforms. 
“Public Integrity Index” 
One such tool is given below. 
(Indicators related to judiciary; full list of indicators and methodology available at 
http://www.globalintegrity.org/default.aspx?act=10#4) 
 
III-3  Judiciary 
36  In law, is the independence of the judiciary guaranteed? 
37  Is the appointment process for high court judges effective? 
37a  In practice, there is a transparent procedure for selecting high court judges. 
37b  In practice, there are certain professional criteria required for the selection of 
high court judges. 
37c  In law, there is a confirmation process for high court judges (i.e. conducted 
by the legislature or an independent body). 
37d  In law, high court judges are protected from removal without relevant 
justification. 
37e  In practice, high court judges are protected from political interference. 
38  Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions? 
38a  In law, members of the judiciary are obliged to give reasons for their 
decisions. 
38b  In practice, members of the judiciary give reasons for their decisions. 
38c  In law, there is an ombudsman (or equivalent agency) for the judicial system. 
38d  In law, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency) is protected from 
political interference. 
38e  In practice, when necessary, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency) 
initiates investigations. 
38f  In practice, when necessary, the judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency) 
imposes penalties on offenders. 
39  Can citizens access the judicial system? 
39a  In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a 
legal suit. 
39b  In practice, a typical small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit. 
39c  In practice, the state provides legal counsel for defendants in criminal cases 
who cannot afford it. 
39d  In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic 
location. 
40  In law, is there a program to protect witnesses in corruption cases? 
41  Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases? 
41a  In practice, in the last year, no high court judges have been physically harmed 
because of adjudicating corruption cases. 
41b  In practice, in the last year, no high court judges have been killed because of 
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